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THE U.S. DISCOVERY-EU PRIVACY
DIRECTIVE CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTING A
THREE-TIERED COMPLIANCE STRATEGY
CARLA

L. REYES*

INTRODUCTION
Because of the different regulatory approaches of the United
States and the European Union, litigants involved in U.S.-EU transborder litigation face a difficult situation regarding discovery. U.S.
discovery procedures require litigants to produce any requested
information under their control without regard to whether the
information originated within U.S. borders.1 Meanwhile, the
European Union prohibits the transfer of data originating within its
borders to the United States because it has determined that the
United States lacks adequate data protection standards.2 The steady
increase of trans-border litigation has brought the conflict between
U.S. discovery rules and EU data protection laws into sharp focus and
spurred intense debate.
Despite calls from EU member states' data protection authorities
for the Article 29 Working Party ("Working Party") to comment on
the issue,3 the lead EU administrative data protection body has
remained silent. In the absence of such guidance from the Working
Party, litigants in U.S.-EU trans-border disputes are left floundering
in their attempts to comply with U.S. discovery rules without violating
EU data protection law. This note sifts through the quagmire of
regulations to help trans-border litigants view the U.S. discovery-EU

Copyright © 2009 by Carla L. Reyes.
* Candidate for the degrees of J.D. and LL.M in International and Comparative Law,
Duke University School of Law, and MPP, Duke University Terry Sanford Institute of Public
Policy. I would like to thank Joseph Cutler of Perkins Coie, LLP, for his insight and guidance
during the drafting of this piece.
1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
2. See infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
3. Alan Charles Raul & Edward McNicholas, French CNIL Examines Data Protection
Issues Linked to U.S. Litigation Disclosures, 3 PRIV. & DATA SEC. L.J. 358, 358, 361 *2008)
(describing the French Data Protection Authority ("CNIL") analysis of the problem and the
French push to put the issue on the Working Party's agenda).
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data protection conflict through a transnational legal lens, and
thereby, construct a strategy for compliance that respects U.S., EU
and international law.
This note proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the nature and
scope of the U.S. discovery-EU Privacy Directive conflict and
investigates its roots in the larger differences between civil and
common legal systems' approach to evidence gathering. Part II
examines possible solutions to the legal quandary posed by the
conflicting requirements, and Part III constructs the best possible
compliance strategy for real world litigants.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT CONFLICT AND ITS
HISTORICAL ROOTS
Litigants in U.S. courts face strict penalties for failure to comply
with the discovery process.4 When data involved in the discovery
process is located or originated in the European Union, these same
litigants face strict penalties under EU data protection law for
transferring the data to the United States This places litigants in
U.S.-EU trans-border disputes in a difficult position. The conflict
between the two sets of requirements has been a recent source of
heated debate,6 fueled, in part, by the long-standing disagreement
between civil and common legal systems over the appropriate nature
of evidence-gathering procedures.
A. The Conflict: EU data protection law confronts U.S. discovery
rules.
The European Union began harmonizing the data protection
laws of its member states with the adoption of Directive 95/46/EC
("Privacy Directive"). 7 The Privacy Directive restricts the transfer

4. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.
5. For example, the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL) fined Tyco Healthcare
E 30,000 (approximately $40,350) for violations of its data protection law. CNIL, La CNIL
condamne la socidt6 Tyco Healthcare France A 30,000 euros d'amende pour manque de
cooperation et de transparence (May 31, 2007), http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=2206
&news[cur]=6&news[uid]=440&cHash=20af941343 [hereinafter CNIL, Tyco].
6. See CNIL, Discovery Case: Another Sensitive Issue, www.cnil.fr/index.php?2464
(describing France's concern over the growing conflict between U.S. discovery rules and the
privacy of personal data); Michael B. de Leeuw & Philip A. Wellner, What to do About Data in
the EU?, N.Y. L.J., May 23, 2008 (detailing the difficulties for EU-U.S. trans-border litigants).
7. Council Directive 95/46, on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter
Privacy Directive]. The Privacy Directive creates an administrative data protection authority for
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and processing of "personal data," which is broadly defined as "any

information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. '
Privacy Directive Article 25 forbids the transfer of personal data to a
third country unless the third country provides an adequate level of
data protection.! Furthermore, if a specific third country is found to
lack adequate data protection, EU member states are required to

take affirmative steps to prevent the transfer of personal data to that
country.'" The EU position is that the United States lacks adequate
data protection standards." As a result, the United States and the

European Union negotiated a safe harbor mechanism by which
companies may voluntarily increase their level of data protection and

become eligible for data transfers from the European Union.2 The
safe harbor, however, does not cover all sectors of data, 3 and, while

specifically designed to govern data transfers, it also imposes

the entire European Union, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party ("Working Party").
See id. art. 29 (creating the Working Party). See also id. arts. 30-31 (detailing the Working
Party's responsibilities). As part of its mandate, the Working Party issues opinions and
interpretations of the Privacy Directive and its application. The opinions and recommendations
of the Working Party are not binding on EU member states. Joseph Cutler & Carla L. Reyes,
Was That Your Computer Talking to Me? The EU and IP Addresses as "Personal Data",
CYBERSPACE Law., Aug. 2008, at 1, 5 (correction printed in Note from the Editor,
CYBERSPACE LAW., Nov. 2008, at 2, 3). Nonetheless, "the Working Party opinions are often
adopted by Members States and influence EU policy making in the privacy field." Id.
8. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 2(a). Furthermore, "an identifiable natural person
is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification
number or ... one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic,
cultural or social identity." Id. Thus, to qualify as personal data, the Working Party requires that
the data fit within each of the following criteria: (1) any information, (2) relating to, (3) an
identified or identifiable, (4) natural person. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party
[hereinafter Working Party], Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, at 6,
01248/07/EN, WP 136 (June 20, 2007) [hereinafter WP 136] (detailing the specific requirements
for meeting each of the four criteria).
9. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 25(1).
10. Id. art. 25(4).
11. Working Party, Opinion 10/2006 on the Processing of Personal Data by the Society for
Worldwide Interbank FinancialTelecommunication (SWIFT), at 21, 01935/06/EN, WP 128 (Nov.
22, 2006) [hereinafter WP 128].
12. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (July 21, 2000),
www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPrivacy.asp [hereinafter Safe Harbor Principles].
13. Id. at pmbl. (defining "personal data" as "data about an identified or identifiable
individual that are within the scope of the Directive, received by a U.S. organization from the
European Union, and recorded in any form").
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restrictions on data processing which render the use of the Safe
Harbor framework problematic in the U.S. discovery context."
The Privacy Directive also places a variety of restrictions on the
processing of personal data. For example, Privacy Directive Article 6
requires personal data to "be processed fairly and lawfully[,]... be
collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes, and not be
used for incompatible purposes."' 5 Furthermore, "the processed data
must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the' 6
purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed. '
Additionally, data subjects must have the opportunity to correct
erroneous data, 7 and personal data may not be retained longer than
necessary."

The Privacy Directive restrictions on transfers and processing of
personal data pose a problem for litigants involved in U.S.-EU transborder litigation. First, the Privacy Directive transfer provisions
restrict the scope of discoverable data. Second, because "processing"
is defined as the "collection, recording, organization, storage,
adaptation, or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment
or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction" of personal data,9
the processing requirements apply to "virtually any action that a U.S.
litigator would take" in preparation for trial.20
Thus, parties to U.S.-EU trans-border litigation may not be able
to comply with U.S. discovery requirements without violating EU
data protection law. However, full compliance with the Privacy
Directive may require refusal to comply with a U.S. discovery
request. Notably, entities subject to the Privacy Directive face strict
monetary penalties for any violation, 2' and failure to comply with U.S.

14. See generally Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 12 (detailing requirements for onward
transfers to be lawfully made and imposing restrictions on how that data can be further
processed).
15. Working Party, Opinion 1/2006 on the Application of EU Data Protection rules to
Internal Whistleblowing Schemes in the Fields of Accounting, Internal Accounting Controls,
Auditing Matters, Fight Against Bribery, Banking and FinancialCrime, at 9, 00195/06/EN, WP
117 (Feb. 1, 2006) [hereinafter WP 117] (citing Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 6).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 14.
18. Id. at 12.
19. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 2(b).
20. Leeuw & Wellner, supra note 6.
21. For example, the Italian data protection authority fined GS, a supermarket chain,
54,000 euros for violations of the Italian legislation implementing the Privacy Directive.

20091

U.S. DISCOVERY-EU PRIVACY DIRECTIVE CONFLICT

discovery requests can result in "severe sanctions, including contempt
proceedings, monetary fines, prosecution for obstruction of justice,
prejudicial jury instructions, and dismissal of claims. '' 22 Litigants are
therefore left to decide which set of laws to violate - EU data
protection or U.S. discovery.
The U.S. discovery-EU Privacy Directive conflict is part of a
larger disjunction between common and civil legal approaches to
evidence gathering.
The tension between EU data protection law and U.S. discovery
rules presents a new manifestation of an enduring conflict between
civil and common law evidence-gathering procedures. The differences
in common and civil legal systems with regard to evidence gathering
have been the source of tension for decades. At its core, the
disagreement centers not on the goals of evidence gathering, but on
the mechanism for achieving those goals.
The United States, a common law jurisdiction, employs an
evidence-gathering procedure referred to as pre-trial discovery. 3 Pretrial discovery is the gathering of evidence after a lawsuit is filed but
prior to trial.24 The United States adopted pre-trial discovery
procedures to encourage the free flow of information, truth-finding,
and informational equity between parties.25 Specifically, the pre-trial
discovery rules embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure26
allow litigants to obtain any information relevant to the claim or
defense of a party.27 To be discoverable, information need not be
admissible at trial; it must only be relevant and reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.28 Notably, the scope
B.

ADDLESHAW GODDARD, DATA AND INFORMATION UPDATE 14 (2008), http://www.addlesha

wgoddard.com/assetstore/document/datainformation-updatesummer 08101528.pdf.
In France, CNIL has also fined companies. See CNIL, Tyco, supra note 5.
22. Stanley W. Crosley, Alan Charles Raul, Edward R. McNicholas & Julie M. Dwyer, A
Path to Resolving EuropeanData Protection Concerns with U.S. Discovery, 6 BNA PRIVACY &
SEC. L. REP. 1, 2 (2007), available at http://www.sidley.comlfiles/Publication/7ed26a68-lec744eb-9db6-3660d938f575fPresentationlPubicationAttachment/166eaabb-2a74.43fe-8a963d78194
ec198/EuroDataProtection.pdf.
23. Stephen F. Black, United States TransnationalDiscovery: The Rise and Fall of the
Hague Evidence Convention, 40 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 901, 902 (1991).
24. See, e.g., id. at 902-03.
25. Id.
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
27. Id. R. 26(b)(1).
28. Id.
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of information potentially covered by the discovery rules is extremely
broad, and it is the parties themselves that gather the evidence.
These two aspects of the discovery process give rise to most of the
objections raised by civil law countries, which view the scope of U.S.
discovery as intrusive and the identity of the fact-finder
inappropriate."
Civil law countries also seek to promote justice through rules of
civil procedure, but they do so in an entirely different fashion. First,
most civil law countries view evidence gathering as a sovereign
function best carried out by an active judge.31 Typically, in civil
systems "the judge questions the witnesses and decides which
documents to request., 32 Because of this active role, the scope of
discovery is naturally limited in civil law systems by the discretion of
the judge, and foreign litigators often view the U.S. discovery process,
placed in the hands of the parties, "as fostering 'fishing expeditions'
by U.S. lawyers eager to build a case and perhaps impose costs on
their adversaries., 33 Some countries, such as France, so vehemently
oppose the U.S. discovery model that they enacted statutes
specifically designed to block the application of U.S. discovery rules
to their citizens.34

Given the historical tension between U.S. discovery rules and
European approaches to evidence gathering, it is unsurprising that
U.S. discovery rules conflict with EU data protection law, since it is
another area where the European Union views U.S. regulation as
inadequate. After all, given the general distaste in civil legal systems
for U.S. discovery procedures, it is only natural that in an area viewed
as a fundamental human right, such as data privacy, the conflict
would increasingly grow. The question then becomes not how to
29. See id. R. 26(a) (describing duty of one party to disclose to the others); id. R. 26(b)(1)
(detailing the scope of discoverable information).
30.

ANTITRUST LAW SECTION OF THE AM. BAR ASS'N, OBTAINING DISCOVERY ABROAD

1-2 (2d ed. 2005).
31. Id. at 1. See also Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialDiscovery: Cooperation, Coercion
and the Hague Evidence Convention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNT'L L. 239, 242-43 (1986).
32. ANTITRUST LAW SECTION OF THE AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 30, at 1.
33. Id. at 3.
34. For France's blocking statute, see Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980, Journal Officiel de
la R~publique Franqaise [JO.] [Official Gazette of France], July 17, 1980, p. 1799. Switzerland
and the United Kingdom also have blocking statutes. For Switzerland's blocking statute, see
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] Nov. 8, 1934, art. 271. For the blocking statute of the
United Kingdom, see British Protection of Trading Secrets Act, 1980, c. 11. For further
discussion of blocking statutes, see generally ANTITRUST LAW SECTION OF THE AM. BAR ASS'N,

supra note 30.
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eliminate the tension, but whether litigants can navigate both sets of
laws without incurring penalties.
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE U.S.-EU TRANS-BORDER
LITIGANT'S LEGAL QUANDARY
A litigant involved in a U.S.-EU trans-border dispute may
generally seek to comply with both U.S. discovery rules and the
Privacy Directive by either persuading U.S. courts to accept restricted
discovery production or using exceptions to the Privacy Directive to
fully comply with U.S. discovery rules. A litigant seeking to persuade
U.S. courts to accept restricted production may seek to either
substitute the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters ("Hague Evidence Convention")
procedures for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or obtain a
protective order on the basis of EU data protection laws. On the
other hand, a litigant using Privacy Directive exceptions to fully
comply with U.S. discovery requirements must both use exceptions to
the Privacy Directive's transfer provisions to remove restrictions on
the scope of discovery and justify processing of lawfully transferred
data under Privacy Directive Article 7.
Solution A: Persuade U.S. courts to accept restricted discovery
production.
A litigant in a U.S.-EU trans-border dispute generally has two
options for persuading U.S. courts to accept restricted discovery
production. First, the litigant may argue that the Hague Evidence
Convention governs the dispute rather than the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." Alternatively, the litigant may seek a protective order on
the basis that full discovery will expose the litigant to sanctions in the
European Union.36 Notably, the first strategy has not yet been used by
a litigant in the specific context of the U.S. discovery-EU Privacy
Directive conflict. The second strategy of seeking a protective order,
37
however, has been successfully employed by litigants in this context.

35. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
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Option 1: Persuade the court to use the Hague Evidence
Convention instead of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Although this option has not yet been pursued by litigants in this
context, a litigant could overcome the U.S. discovery-EU Privacy

Directive conflict by persuading the court to use the Hauge Evidence
Convention instead of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Hague Evidence Convention, concluded on March 18, 1970, 3s sought

to bridge the gap between evidence gathering procedures in civil and
common law countries by providing three mechanisms to be used in
either system: letters of request, diplomatic or consular officers, and
appointed commissioners.39

The most helpful of these procedures for dealing with a conflict
between the Privacy Directive and U.S. discovery rules is the letter of
request. A letter of request is a formal procedure whereby the court
presiding over a civil or commercial judicial proceeding in one
country can ask the judicial authority of another country to gather °
evidence for use in the judicial proceeding in the requesting state.
Each country that ratified the Hague Evidence Convention
designated a central authority to which all letters of request are sent
42
for execution.4 ' A letter of request must be executed expeditiously

and may only be refused in specific cases.43 However, the person or
persons from whom the executing country must gather the evidence

38. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague Evidence
Convention].
39. Id. chs. I, II.
40. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Outline of the Hague Convention of
18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in civil or Commercial Matters (2008),
http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/outine20e.pdf [hereinafter HCCH, Outline of the Hague Evidence
Convention].
41. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 38, art. 2.
42. In order to cut down on the time required to execute a letter of request, the European
Union issued Council Regulation 1206/2001, Cooperation Between the Courts of the Member
States in Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L174) 1, 2 [hereinafter
Evidence Regulation]. The Evidence Regulation replaces the Hague Evidence Convention as
between EU member states and streamlines the process in order to reduce the time necessary
for gathering evidence when litigation involves parties in multiple EU member states. Id.
43. HCCH, Outline of the Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 40, at 1. A letter of
request can only be refused in its entirety if execution is not within the function of the judiciary
or execution would threaten the country's sovereignty or security. See Hague Evidence
Convention, supra note 38, art. 12. A letter of request cannot be refused in its entirety solely
because the requested country would not recognize the underlying legal claim or because the
country asserts it has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter. Id.
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"may refuse to give evidence in so far as he has a privilege or duty to
refuse to give the evidence.., under the law of the State of
execution.""
Hague Evidence Convention letters of request can allow litigants
to fulfill U.S. discovery requirements while simultaneously complying
with the Privacy Directive in one of two ways: lawfully producing only
non-personal data, or fully producing all relevant information,
including personal data, pursuant to an order of an EU Member State
judicial authority.
First, if the litigant facing an evidence request from an EU
Hague Evidence Convention executing authority successfully shows
that compliance would require the production of personal data in
violation of the Privacy Directive, the EU executing authority may
rely on Article 11 of the Hague Evidence Convention and excuse
production.45 It appears that as long as the letter of request is
executed to the fullest extent under the executing country's domestic
law, U.S. discovery requirements implemented via the Hague
Evidence Convention are fulfilled without violating the Privacy
Directive.
Alternatively, if the EU executing country could be persuaded
that the personal data sought is vital to establishing a legal claim or
defense, the executing judicial authority could lawfully order full
compliance with the letter of request despite the Privacy Directive's
transfer and processing restrictions. The Privacy Directive allows
transfer of personal data to an entity in a third country lacking
adequate data protection standards if "the transfer is necessary... for
the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims."' Additionally,
processing of personal data is legitimate if it "is necessary for a legal
obligation to which a data controller is subject. 4 7 Notably, the legal
obligation must be one imposed by an EU member state. 8 If a

44. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 38, art. 11.
45. Article 11 of the Hague Evidence Convention states that "[i]n the execution of a Letter
of Request the person concerned may refuse to give evidence in so far as he has a privilege or
duty to refuse to give the evidence under the law of the State of execution." Id.
46. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 26(1)(d).
47. Id. art. 7(c).
48. See WP 117, supra note 15, at 8 ("[A]n obligation imposed by a foreign legal statute or
regulation ... may not qualify as a legal obligation by virtue of which data processing in the EU
would be made legitimate."). See also WP 128, supra note 11, at 18 (confirming that foreign
legal obligations do not satisfy Article 7(c) because "[a]ny other interpretation would make it
easy for foreign rules to circumvent the EU rules laid down in the Directive").
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European judicial authority required production of personal data
pursuant to a letter of request, the resulting transfer would be for the
establishment or defense of legal claims and any processing would
therefore be for compliance with a legal obligation imposed on the
data controller. Under such circumstances, any processing must also
comply with Privacy Directive requirements that personal data be
processed fairly and lawfully,49 that it be used only for the purposes
for which it was received," and that no data regarding a person's
racial or ethnic origins, political opinions, religious beliefs, tradeunion membership, health, or sex life be processed. 1
Each of these alternatives requires persuading a U.S. court to use
the Hague Evidence Convention procedures rather than the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the United States ratified the
Hague Evidence Convention, the Supreme Court has long held that
"both the discovery rules set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Hague [Evidence] Convention are the law of the
United States."52 However, the Hague Evidence Convention was
meant as "a supplement, not a pre-emptive replacement, for other
means of obtaining evidence located abroad."53 As such, the Hague
Evidence Convention will not automatically apply in trans-border
litigation, and a party must persuade the court to use letters of
request instead of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 In analyzing
a party's motion to use the Hague Evidence Convention in a transborder dispute, courts use a three-part test to examine: first, "the
particular facts of the case, particularly with regard to the nature of
the discovery requested,"55 second, "the sovereign interests in issue,
and,"56 third, "the likelihood that the Convention procedures will
49. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 6(a).
50. Id. art. 6(b).
51. Id. art. 8. At this juncture, it is important to note that Privacy Directive Article 8
provides three exceptions to its prohibition of processing sensitive data that would allow such
processing during a lawsuit: (1) the data subject has given his specific consent, (2) "processing is
necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and specific rights of the controller in
the field of employment law insofar as it is authorized by national law providing for adequate
safeguards," and (3) "the processing relates to data which are manifestly made public by the
data subject or is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims." Id. art.
8(2)(a), 8(2)(b), 8(2)(e).
52. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522, 533 (1987).
53. Id. at 536.
54. See id. at 533-40.
55. In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 354 (D. Conn. 1991).
56. Id.
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prove effective. '"" The party moving to substitute the Hague
Evidence Convention for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure bears
the burden of persuasion."
Under the first prong, which requires an examination of the
nature of the discovery requested, courts will favor the Hague
Evidence Convention procedures when the discovery calls for broad
responses rather than being narrowly tailored. 9 This result stems
from the Supreme Court's requirement that, because of foreign
litigants' unfamiliarity with U.S. discovery procedures, "American
courts, in supervising pretrial proceedings, [must] exercise special
viligance [sic] to protect foreign litigants from the danger that
unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in a
disadvantageous position.""
Under the second prong, "the appropriate inquiry.., is the 'host'
country's amenability to the manner of discovery sought to be utilized
by the plaintiffs."6 To that end, courts consider the domestic law of
the host country regarding civil procedure. 62 The second prong will
especially favor the Hague Evidence Convention if the host country
has directly stated its opposition to U.S. discovery procedures or
ratified the Hague Evidence Convention with a strong Article 23
reservation. 63

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 354-55.
60. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987).
61. PerrierBottled Water, 138 F.R.D. at 355.
62. See id.
63. See id. (noting that France was the most emphatic critic of U.S. discovery procedure,
adopted a blocking statute, ratified the Hague Evidence Convention, and even adopted laws
preventing the unauthorized use of procedures other than the Hague Evidence Convention in
trans-border disputes).
Article 23 reservations allow state-parties to the Hague Evidence Convention to
declare that they will not enforce any pre-trial discovery order. Some countries have stronger
Article 23 reservations than others, especially since the Hague Conference on Private
International Law cleared up the misunderstanding shared by many countries that "pre-trial"
discovery meant discovery prior to the filing of a legal claim. For an example of a strong Article
23 reservation, see that of France, which states:
In accordance with the provisions of Article 33, the French Government declares: that
in pursuance of Article 4, para. 2, it will execute Letters of Request only if they are in
French or if they are accompanied by a translation into French; that, in pursuance of
Article 23, Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of
documents as known in Common Law countries will not be executed;
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Evidence

Convention unless there is a fact specific reason the procedures will
be ineffective.' An allegation that the Hague Evidence Convention
procedures will cause time delays is insufficient to cause the third
prong to favor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6"
Importantly, if the Hague Evidence Convention is used and the

U.S. court is not satisfied with the scope of evidence obtained, the
court retains the power to order production under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 66 If production is ordered, especially after a
European court relied on the Privacy Directive in refusing to fulfill
the production requests, compliance would require violating data
protection laws of the European Union.
Option 2: Obtain a protective order on the basis of EU data
protection law.
When U.S. discovery requests conflict with the law of a foreign
nation, U.S. courts sometimes grant a protective order releasing the
party from its obligation to produce evidence. The party relying on
foreign law bears the burden of showing that foreign law actually bars

The declaration made by the French Republic in accordance with Article 23 relating to
Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents
does not apply when the requested documents are enumerated limitatively in the
Letter of Request and have a direct and precise link with the object of the procedure.
Hague Conference on Private International Law, France's Reservations and Declarationsto the
Hague Evidence Convention, http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=status.comment&csid=501
&disp=resdn.
For an example of a moderate, and more common, Article 23 reservation, see that of
the United Kingdom, which states:
In accordance with Article 23 Her Majesty's Government declare that the United
Kingdom will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents. Her Majesty's Government further declare that Her
Majesty's Government understand "Letters of Request issued for the purpose of
obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents" for the purposes of the foregoing
Declaration as including any Letter of Request which requires a person: (a.) to state
what documents relevant to the proceedings to which the Letter of Request relates are,
or have been, in his possession, custody or power; or (b.) to produce any documents
other than particular documents specified in the Letter of Request as being documents
appearing to the requested court to be, or to be likely to be, in his possession, custody
or power.
Hague Conference on Private International Law, United Kingdom's Reservations and
Declarationsto the Hague Evidence Convention, http://www.hcch.net/index en.php?act=status.c
omment&csid=564&disp=resdn.
64. PerrierBottled Water, 138 F.R.D. at 355-56.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 356.
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production of evidence.67 That burden is met by "providing the [c]ourt
with information of sufficient particularity and specificity to allow the

[c]ourt to determine whether the discovery sought is indeed
prohibited by foreign law."'

In meeting this burden, it is helpful to

obtain a statement from the foreign country that its law actually bars
disclosure of the information.6 9

Even if the party resisting discovery proves a conflict between
U.S. and foreign law, the court retains the power to deny the
protective order. In deciding how to rule, the court engages in a casespecific analysis of five factors:7' first, "the importance to the

investigation or litigation of the documents or other information
requested,, 71 second, "the degree of specificity of the request,, 72 third,
whether the information originated in the United States,73 fourth, the
availability of alternative means of securing the information, 74 and
fifth, "the extent to which noncompliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance
with the request would undermine
important interests of the state
75

where the information is located.

The first factor regarding the importance of discovery usually
weighs in favor of parties resisting the production of documents that

67. Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing United States v. Vetco, 691
F.2d 1281, 1289 (9th Cir. 1981)).
68. Id.
69. See Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W2d 900, 902 (Tex. 1995) (noting that
Germany's amicus brief declaring disclosure would violate the German Data Protection Act
made the conflict between the U.S. discovery order and foreign law obvious); Alfadda, 149
F.R.D. at 34-35 (finding that the failure of the Swiss government to submit a statement that
disclosure of the information at issue threatened their national interests evidenced that no
threat existed).
70. Courts have adopted these factors from the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations.
See Volkswagen, 909 S.W.2d at 902; Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d
2468, 1474-75 (1992) (citing Societe Nationale Industrielle Aeropostale v. U.S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987) as the key case anticipating the adoption of the Restatement
(Third) factors by U.S. Courts). See also Alfadda, 149 F.R.D. at 34 (relying on a modified
version of the Restatement factors). The adoption of the Restatement (Third) factors is a natural
progression from the earlier use of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations, upon which
the Restatement (Third) was built. See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 103
F.R.D. 42, 45 (1984); Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1288.
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 442(1)(c) (1987).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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may aid in proving their own claim or defense. 6 When parties resist

the production of documents that will hurt their case, this first factor
weighs in favor of denying the protective order." Furthermore,

"[c]ourts have refused to require production where the documents
sought are largely cumulative of records already produced. 78 Under
the second factor, the key inquiry is "how burdensome it will be to
respond to [the] request., 79 In particular,"[g]eneralized searches for
information are discouraged,"' and overbroad requests will be
disfavored as abusive and overly intrusive.81 The third factor will
usually weigh in favor of granting the protective order when the
discoverable material originated in the foreign nation and remains
there, beyond the scope of U.S. jurisdiction. 2
The fourth factor requires courts to "consider whether
substantially equivalent alternate means for obtaining the requested
information are available. 8 3 It often causes courts "considerable
discomfort to think that a court of law should order a violation of law,
particularly on the territory of the sovereign whose law is in
question," and courts seek to avoid such orders whenever possible."
If a court feels that an alternative means of producing the information

76. See generally Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212-13 (1958) (citing an
example where unproduced information may have been helpful to the resisting party's own
cause).
77. See United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 1981) (relying on the fact
that the documents Vetco sought not to produce were relevant to proving their tax liability in
determining that the importance of the documents weighed in favor of denying the protective
order).
78. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1475 (1992); Vetco, 691
F.2d. at 1290 (using the Restatement (Second) factor, "importance of documents," which
eventually became the first factor in the Restatement (Third) test).
79. Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1475.
80. Id.
81. In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 354-55 (D. Conn. 1991).
82. Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900, 902-03 (Tex. 1995) (using the fact that the
eleven materials sought were in Germany to support a decision that the trial court abused its
discretion in issuing the production order). See also Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1475 ("The fact that
all the information to be disclosed (and the people who will be deposed or who will produce the
documents) are located in a foreign country weighs against the disclosure .... ").
83. Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1290 (relying on the Restatment (Second) version of this factor).
Vetco's formulation of this test was retained after the move from the Restatement (Second) to
the Restatement (Third) and thus continues to be the test under the Restatement (Third)'s fourth
factor. Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1475 (citing Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1290) ("[T]he alternative means
must be "substantially equivalent" to the requested discovery.").
84. In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 498 (D.C. 1987).
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is equivalent to the one requested and will not violate foreign law,
this fourth factor will weigh in favor of granting the protective order."
When evaluating the fifth factor, the effect of the court's action
on U.S. and foreign interests, U.S. interests are weighed against the
interests of the foreign sovereign. The U.S. interest is generally
articulated as "ensuring parties a full and fair adjudication of their
case."

6

In assessing the interests of the foreign sovereign, U.S. courts

value input from the foreign government. In fact, the party seeking
the protective order is more likely to prevail if the foreign sovereign
submits a statement or otherwise expresses that violating the foreign
law, even to comply with a U.S. discovery order, severely undermines
sovereign interests.Y The party seeking the protective order is also
more likely to prevail if the very act of producing documents will
violate foreign law, rather than when foreign law requires an event to
trigger a violation, such as a report or return to the home country. 88
Lastly, apart from any formal factors, courts are more likely to
grant a protective order to a party which, although resisting discovery,
notably made good faith efforts to comply with the discovery process
to the greatest possible extent."
Two courts have granted protective orders specifically on the
basis of EU data protection laws. In Volkswagen v. Valdez,
Volkswagen objected to a discovery request for its current corporate
telephone book containing the names, work telephone numbers, and
home telephone numbers of over 20,000 employees.9" Using the five85. See generally Volkswagen, 909 S.W.2d at 903 (holding that the company was not
required to produce a German copy of a document when its American equivalent was
available).
86. ANTIRUST LAW SECTION OF THE AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 30, at 58 (citing Minpecov.
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 667 F. Supp 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
87. See Volkswagen, 909 S.W.2d at 902-03. See also Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 34-35
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (counting the fifth factor against the party resisting discovery because, in part,
Switzerland did not submit a statement that violation of the secrecy laws would seriously
undermine Swiss interests). In many instances, U.S. courts view these statements from the

foreign soverign as confirmation that an important foreign national interest exists apart from a
general dislike of U.S. pre-trial discovery. ANTITRUST LAW SECTION OF THE AM. BAR ASS'N.,

supra note 30, at 57. When the foreign law at issue is a blocking statute, U.S. courts will
generally give the foreign interest less weight. Id. at 53. Genuine concern for data privacy, on
the other hand, will generally be respected; however, U.S. courts appreciate confirmation that
the law at issue represents the latter rather than the former. Id.

88. See Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1290; Alfadda, 149 F.R.D. at 35.
89. In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2dat 498. See Volkswagen, 909 S.W.2d at 903; Alfadda, 149
F.R.D. at 40.
90. Volkswagen, 909 S.W.2d at 901.
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factor test, the court ruled in favor of Volkswagen. Agreeing with a
brief submitted by Germany, the court found that: production of the
book would violate German data protection law,91 sufficiently
equivalent alternative production methods had already been used by
Volkswagen,' and production of the current corporate book was
requested solely to enable the plaintiffs to re-check the information
already discovered through other sources.

93

Similarly, in Salerno v. Lecia, the court denied a motion to
compel discovery because production of the documents requested
would violate both the Privacy Directive and the German Data
Protection Act. 9' Although the court did not specifically rely on the
five-factor test when conducting its analysis, it did find that the
European Union had overtly expressed its interests in upholding the
Privacy Directive, alternative methods of production were not
sufficiently equivalent, and serious ramifications exist for violating
the Privacy Directive and its implementing legislation such as the
German Data Protection Act.95
As the above discussion reveals, U.S. courts can be persuaded to
accept restricted production, whether by protective order or
substitution of the Hague Evidence Convention Procedures for the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such decisions to restrict
production, however, are within the discretion of the court, leaving
litigants vulnerable to violations of EU data protection law in the
absence of a favorable ruling. As a result, it is important to also
examine the possible solutions to the U.S.-EU trans-border litigants'
legal quandary provided by the EU Privacy Directive.
Solution B: Use exceptions to the Privacy Directive to fully comply
with the U.S. discovery requirements.
If the U.S. court requires the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be
used instead of the Hague Evidence Convention and denies the
protective order, a litigant may nevertheless attempt to fully comply
with U.S. discovery requirements by relying on exceptions to the
Privacy Directive. In order to fully comply with the Privacy Directive,
however, the litigant must both establish that an exception to the

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 902-03.
Id. at 903.
Id.
Salerno v. Lecia, Inc., No. 97-CV-973S(H) 1999 WL 299306, *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 1999).
Id.
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transfer restrictions in Article 25 applies and justify processing under
Article

7.96

Part 1: Use exceptions to the Privacy Directive transfer
provisions to remove the restrictions on the scope of
personal data available for discovery.
The Privacy Directive prohibits the onward transfer of personal
data originating in the European Union to third countries lacking
adequate data protection.7 Nevertheless, such transfers can lawfully
occur under the Privacy Directive framework. There are three
alternatives for lawfully transferring personal data to third countries
lacking adequate data protection; however, the Working Party has
created an order of preference for these alternatives." The most
favored method for onward transfers to the United States, a country
lacking adequate data protection, is transferring data to an entity
participating in the safe harbor program. 99 If use of the safe harbor is
not available, the Working Party recommends using the derogations
listed in Privacy Directive Article 26(2)." According to the Working
Party, the third method, the exceptions in Privacy Directive Article
26(1), should only be used as a last resort.'
Option A: Safe Harbor.
Although the Working Party prefers that transfers to U.S.
entities take place through the safe harbor mechanism, the safe
harbor was not designed to encompass transfers for compliance with
U.S. discovery requirements."' The safe harbor mechanism creates a

presumption of adequate data protection standards in any U.S. entity
that adopts the required processing principles and allows EU entities
to transfer personal data to qualified U.S. entities without violating
the Privacy Directive. 3 Thus, conceivably, if the United States party
to a U.S.-EU trans-border dispute qualified under the safe harbor
96. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, arts. 7, 25.
97. Id. art. 25.
98. Working Party, Working Document on a Common Interpretationof Article 26(1) of
Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, at 9, 2093/05/EN, WP 114 (Nov. 25, 2005) [hereinafter
WP 114].
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 12.
103. Id.

374

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 19:357

mechanism, direct transfers between the parties would be covered.

However, transfers to opposing counsel or a U.S. court would be
considered additional onward transfers and be specifically prohibited
under the terms of the safe harbor principles.' As a result, the safe
harbor mechanism is of little utility in the U.S. discovery context1
Option B: Rely on Privacy Directive Article 26(2) derogations to

create an alternative structure for the transfer of
personal data to litigants in the United States.

Article 26(2) allows "transfers to a 'non-adequate' third country

'where the controller adduces adequate safeguards with respect to the
protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of

individuals and as regards the exercise of the corresponding rights.""' 6
The Working Party has identified two types of adequate safeguards a
controller may adopt in order to satisfy the Article 26(2) derogation
from Article 25: contractual clauses and binding corporate rules."°
Contractual clauses. In order to constitute an "adequate
safeguard" under Article 26(2), a contractual clause must
"determin[e] how the responsibility for data protection compliance is
split between the two parties [and] provide additional safeguards for

104. Id. The Safe Harbor Onward Transfer Principle allows, under certain conditions, a
safe-harbor participating organization to transfer data to third parties not participating in the
Safe Harbor for processing. If the non-safe-harbor participating third party is acting as the
organization's agent, data may be transferred to it for processing if the participating
organization first ascertains that the non-safe-harbor third party is obligated to uphold the
principles of the Privacy Directive, either by application of another law or by contractual
obligations between the parties. Id. If, however "the [participating] organization knew or should
have known the third party would process it in" a way contrary to the Privacy Directive, the
participating organization will be held responsible for the third party's violations. Id. This is
helpful in the U.S. discovery-Privacy Directive context because it allows transfers of data from
the participating organization to their U.S. legal counsel under the Safe Harbor provisions when
the U.S. legal counsel is being retained as an agent of the participating organization and
contractually agrees to provide the same level of protection as the Safe Harbor Principles.
Transfers to non-participating third parties that are not acting as the participating organization's
agent may also occur as long as the participating organization complies with the Notice and
Choice principles of the Safe Harbor. Id. This exception, however, has little application in the
U.S. discovery-EU Privacy Directive context, as U.S. courts disfavor subjecting the discovery
process to the consent of the data subject.
105. See Leeuw & Wellner, supra note 6 (arguing briefly that the safe harbor mechanism
does not control the discovery process and "is, in fact, incompatible with, typical discovery in
the U.S.").
106. Working Party, Working Document on Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries:
Applying Articles 25 & 26 of the EU Data ProtectionDirective, at 15, DG XV D/5025/98, WP 12
(July 24, 1998) [hereinafter WP 12].
107. WP 114, supra note 98, at 5. See also Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 26(2).
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the data subject made necessary by the fact that the recipient in the
third country is not subject to an enforceable set of data protection
rules providing an adequate level of protection."" Specifically, the

contract must provide substantive data protection,
to the data subject,"'

provide redress

and provide support to the affected data

subjects."1 While contractual clauses are generally favored by the
Working Party"' and standard contractual clauses have been
formulated to encourage their standardized use,"' there are two
situations in which the Working Party finds them unworkable: first,
when no supervisory body exists in the third country in which the data
recipient is located"' and second, where the third country authorities
possess the power to access information which "go[es] beyond those
permitted by internationally accepted standards of human rights
protection.""' 5
Given the long-standing disagreement between civil and
common legal systems' approach to evidence gathering" 6 and the
Working Party's specific disapproval of data protection standards in
the context of U.S. legal investigations,"' it is likely that the United

108. WP 12, supra note 106, at 16.
109. Id. at 17-20. The contract must provide for the following substantive data protection
principles: the purpose limitation principle, the data quality and proportionality principle, the
transparency principle, the security principle, the rights of access, rectification and opposition,
and restrictions on onward transfers, with possible additional principles needed for sensitive
data, direct marketing, and automated individual decisions. Id. at 6-7.
110. Id. at 18-20. This refers to enforcement mechanisms so that data subjects whose rights
have been violated can seek redress. Id.
111. Id. at 20. This refers to an institutional mechanism providing for complaint
investigation and a mechanism for compensating data subjects whose rights have been violated.
Id.
112. Working Party, Working Document: Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries:
Applying Article 26(2) of the EU Data Protection Directive to Binding Corporate Rules for
International Data Transfers, at 6, 11639/02/EN, WP 74 (June 3, 2003) [hereinafter WP 74]
(stating that Safe Harbor and contracts are both adequate safeguards which are preferred over
binding corporate rules).
113. Commission Decision 2001/497, On Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of
Personal Data to Third Countries Under Directive 95/46/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 181) 19 (creating a
set of standard contractual clauses); Commission Decision 2004/915, Amending Decision
2001/497/ED as Regards the Introduction of an Alternative Set of Standard Contractual Clauses
for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, 2004 O.J. (L 385) 74.
114. WP 12, supra note 106, at 22.
115. Id. at 23.
116. See supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text.
117. See WP 117, supra note 15, at 5, 8, 11 (describing the conflict between U.S.
whistleblowing schemes and the Privacy Directive and pointing out specific problems with
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States would be considered a third country that falls within both of
the unworkable situations for standard contractual clauses. As a
result, the standard contractual clauses will provide little relief for

litigants facing the U.S. discovery-Privacy Directive conflict.
Binding corporate rules."8 Intended as a tool only to be used
when the safe harbor and contractual clauses are particularly
problematic," 9 binding corporate rules are best suited to deal with

"the international transfer of personal data within the same corporate
group at a multinational level.'

12

1

In order to create an "adequate

safeguard" under Article 26(2), the binding corporate rules must be
approved by the relevant national data protection authority.12' The
national data protection authority will only approve such schemes if
they are binding both internally within the group and externally in a
court of law. 122 Additionally, the binding corporate rules must provide
for: audits, 23 cooperation with data protection authorities,24 a clearly

delineated complaint

handling department,'125 and mechanisms

providing redress and appropriate compensation to data subjects
when necessary. 26

Importantly for the U.S. discovery context, binding corporate
rules only make transfers within the corporate group lawful under

anonymous reports). See also WP 128, supra note 11, at 8-9, 18-22 (describing how the Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication's ("SWIFT") compliance with
subpoenas from the U.S. Treasury violated the Privacy Directive because SWIF did not use an
adequate safeguard when transferring the data to the U.S. government).
118. Note that the term "binding corporate rules" is meant to encompass policies akin to
codes of conduct, but the Working Party did not want to confuse their discussion with Article
27, so it used the term "binding corporate rules." WP 74, supra note 112, at 8.
119. Id. at 6.
120. Id. at 5.
121. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 26(1). See also WP 114, supra note 98, at 5; WP 74,
supra note 112, at 5 ("Data protection authorities receive requests for authorization for the
transfer of personal data to third countries within the meaning of Article 26(2) of the
directive.").
122. WP 74, supra note 112, at 10-11. As regards the externally binding aspect of the binding
corporate rules, data subjects must be regarded in law as third party beneficiaries of the rules
with certain rights. Id. at 12. See also id. at 12 n.12.
123. Id. at 16.
124. Id. at 17.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 18. Data subjects must also be entitled to take action against the controller. See
id. at 19. Furthermore, data subjects must be told of the transfers and the controller needs proof
that data subjects were so informed. Id.
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Article 26(2), not all transfers. 127 Thus, while a party to U.S. litigation

might be able to gather discoverable materials through the use of
binding corporate rules, it could not transfer the discoverable

materials to the parties in the litigation not bound by the rules, or
their counsel. Thus, although binding corporate rules are encouraged

by the Working Party over the exceptions found in Article 26(1),'2
they have limited utility in the U.S. discovery context.
Option C: Rely on Privacy Directive Article 26(1) exceptions to
fully excuse the transfer of personal data to litigants in

the United States.
Article 26(1) of the Privacy Directive provides exceptions to the
requirement in Article 25 that onward transfers of personal data
originating in the European Union only be to countries providing an
adequate level of data protection. 29 However, as a matter of general
EU legal interpretation, exceptions from a general rule "must be
interpreted restrictively."' 3 As such, the Working Party insists that

127. Id. at 9 ("Transfers of personal data to companies outside the corporate groups would
remain possible but not on the basis of the arrangements put in place by legally enforceable
corporate rules but on the basis of any other legitimate grounds under Article 26 of the
Directive .... ").
128. The Working Party has issued several documents instructing how to comply with the
requirements for binding corporate rules in hopes of encouraging corporate groups to adopt
them when applicable. See Working Party, Working Document on Frequently Asked Questions
(FAQs) Related to Binding Corporate Rules, 1271-00-02/08/EN, WP 155 (June 24, 2008)
(clarifying "particular requirements for applicants in order to assist them in gaining approval for
their BCRs"); Working Party, Working Document Setting Up a Frameworkfor the Structure of
Binding Corporate Rules, 1271-00-01/08/EN, WP 154 (June 24, 2008) (suggesting "what the
BCRs might look like when incorporating all of the necessary elements identified in documents
WP 74 and WP 108"); Working Party, Working Document Setting Up a Table with the Elements
and Principles to be Found in Binding Corporate Rules, 1271-00-00/08/EN, WP 153 (June 24,
2008) (clarifying and synthesizing Working Party statements on the necessary content of binding
corporate rules); Working Party, Recommendation 1/2007 on the Standard Application for
Approval of Binding Corporate Rules for the Transfer of PersonalData, WP 133 (Jan. 10, 2007)
(creating a standard document for applying to Data Protection Authorities for the approval of
binding corporate rules); Working Party, Working Document Setting Forth a Co-Operation
Procedure for Issuing Common Opinions on Adequate Safeguards Resulting From "Binding
Corporate Rules," 05/EN, WP 107 (Apr. 14, 2005) (creating a procedure for synthesizing the
data protection authority approval process in multiple E.U. countries); Working Party, Working
Document Establishing a Model Checklist Application for Approval of Binding CorporateRules,
05/EN, WP 108 (Apr. 14, 2005) [hereinafter WP 108] (creating a checklist for compliance with
the requirements for binding corporate rules); WP 74, supra note 112 (describing briefly the
content necessary for Binding Corporate Rules).
129. WP 114, supra note 98, at 6.
130. Id. at 7.
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Article 26(1) can only be applied appropriately when recourse to the
Article 26(2) "framework is impossible in practice, where the risks to
the data subject are small and Articles 6, 7, and 8 applied
appropriately.' 13' Additionally, EU member states can provide, via
domestic law, for the exceptions not to apply in certain cases.
Furthermore, when an entity relies on Article 26(1), the authorities
can, with sufficient reason, "intervene at any time and recommend
that an international transfer of data should be carried out on the
basis of adequate safeguards in the meaning of Article133 26(2) rather
than by applying the exceptions listed in Article 26(1)."
Despite the many restrictions accompanying the Article 26(1)
exceptions, it appears that two exemptions may apply to onward
transfers of personal data originating in the European Union to U.S.
entities for discovery purposes: consent under Article 26(1)(a), and
establishing a legal claim or defense under Article 26(1)(d).
Article 26(1)(a) - Consent. To rely on this exception, consent
must be obtained from each data subject affected by the transfer. 34
Consent usually cannot be implied, 3 5 but instead must be freely given,
specific, and informed. 36 Consent is only considered freely given if it
was given prior to the transfer, the data subject truly had the ability to
withhold consent without suffering harm, and the data subject retains
the right to withdraw consent at any point.137 The consent must be
specific in the sense that the data subject authorizes a particular
transfer or a category of transfers. 38 Lastly, the data subject must
have given consent after receiving information regarding the transfer
recipient's purpose and identity, and the specific risk resulting from
the fact that the data is being transferred to a country providing
inadequate data protection. 9
The Privacy Directive exception for consent is unreliable in the
U.S. discovery context for two reasons. First, in conformance with the

131. Id. at 9.
132. Id. at 7.
133. Id. at 10.
134. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 26(1)(a) (allowing transfers to inadequate third
countries if "the data subject has given his consent") (emphasis added). See also WP 114, supra
note 98, at 10-12 (describing the content to be obtained from each data subject).
135. WP 12, supra note 106, at 24.
136. WP 114, supra note 98, at 11-12.
137. See id. at 10-11.
138. Id. at 12.
139. Id.
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Privacy Directive, the data subject retains the right to withdraw
consent at any time. A withdrawal of consent would mean that the
party that received the data must delete it, rendering it useless in a
litigation context. Second, U.S. courts generally disfavor allowing the
discovery process to be dictated by the will of third parties. In fact,
one court went so far as to say that "attempting to obtain consents
from affected third parties is not an alternate means of production"
because "[i]t may limit the information obtainable."' ° As such, the
consent exception of Article 26(1)(a) has limited utility in the context
of the U.S. discovery-EU Privacy Directive conflict.
Article 26(1)(d) - Establishinga Legal Claim or Defense. Article

26(1)(d) allows transfers to a third country lacking adequate
standards of data protection when "the transfer is necessary ... for

the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims..... To rely on
this exception, the receiving entity must be party to a present legal
proceeding, not an anticipated proceeding." 2 Furthermore, this
exception can only be invoked if the parties have complied with the
Hague Evidence Convention.'
To explain the reach of this
exception, the Working Party used the following hypothetical: where
"the parent company of a multinational group established in a third
country [is] sued by an employee of the group currently posted to one
of its European subsidiaries. The exception in Article 26(1)(d)
appears to allow the company to legally request the European
subsidiary to transfer certain data relating to the employee if these
data are necessary for its defense."'" In this hypothetical, once the
data is lawfully transferred to the parent company headquartered in
the United States, the data would then be subject to the U.S.
discovery process.
The Privacy Directive exception for the establishment of a legal
claim or defense is the most reliable exception to the Article 25
prohibition on transfers to third parties in countries with inadequate
data protection in the U.S. discovery-Privacy Directive context. The
Working Party specifically indicated that Article 26(1)(d)

140. United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1290 (9th Cir. 1981).
141. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 26(1)(d). See also WP 12, supra note 106, at 25.
142. WP 114, supra note 98, at 15 (stating that the exception cannot be used to justify
transfers of data "on the grounds of the possibility that such legal proceedings might be brought
some day").
143. Id.
144. Id.
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encompasses cross-border litigation through the use of the above
hypothetical. The key to successfully relying on this exception is
overcoming a common misunderstanding as to the meaning of the
term "pre-trial discovery" in the U.S. legal system.' 5 Many countries
with civil legal systems understand this term to mean document
recovery before a suit is filed, which the Working Party has
specifically stated is not encompassed by the Article 26(1)(d)
exception.' 6 It behooves litigants relying on this exception, therefore,
to demonstrate through detailed documentation and provision of the
court record to the relevant data protection authority that the data
sought is part of an ongoing legal proceeding.
Part 2: Use Privacy Directive Article (7) to justify processing of
lawfully transferred data by litigants in preparation for
trial.
Even when personal data is lawfully transferred to a nonadequate third country pursuant to one of the three Privacy Directive
alternatives, any processing conducted by the receiving entity must
also be lawful. When data is transferred pursuant to the safe harbor,
the processing principles set forth in that mechanism apply and would
only permit processing that is consistent with the specific purposes for
which the data was collected. 47 When data is transferred pursuant to
an Article 26(2) "adequate safeguard," the Privacy Directive
processing principles apply in full. 41 When data is transferred
pursuant to an Article 26(1) exception, however, only Articles 6, 7,
and 8 apply to the processing of the transferred data.1 49 Notably, for
data to be lawfully processed under any of these three transfer
schemes, processing must satisfy the Article 7 test of legitimate

145. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and Recommendations
Adopted by the Special Commission on the PracticalOperation of the Hague Apostille, Evidence
and Service Conventions, 31 (Oct. 28-Nov. 30, 2003), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/lseconcl-e.pdf.
146. WP 114, supra note 98, at 15.
147. Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 12.
148. See WP 114, supra note 98, at 5 (noting that Article 26(2) adequate safeguards "ensure
that the indifiduals in question continue to be protected as regards processing of their data, once
the data has have been transferred").
149. Id. at 8 (noting compliance with Articles 6 and 8 is required); Working Party, Opinion
8/2001 on the processing of personal data in the employment context, at 26, 5062/0lfEN/Final,
WP 48 (Sept. 13, 2001) [hereinafter WP 48] (noting that Article 7 must also be complied with).
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purposes.

In the U.S. discovery context, there are three possible

justifications for processing discoverable personal data under Privacy
Directive Article 7: first, "necessary for compliance with a legal
obligation to which the controller is subject,' ' 1 second, unambiguous
consent of the data subject, "2 and third, "necessary for the legitimate

interests pursued by the controller."'5 3
Option A: Legal obligations under Privacy Directive Article 7(c).
Article 7(c) authorizes a data controller to process personal data
if it is "necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the
controller is subject.""' The Working Party has twice stated that "an
obligation imposed by a foreign legal statute or regulation... may

not qualify as a legal obligation by virtue of which data processing in
the European Union would be made legitimate."' 55 Privacy Directive

Article 7(c) can only provide an avenue of relief for litigants facing
the U.S. discovery-Privacy Directive conflict if the U.S. discovery

request is enforced against the data controller by an EU judicial
authority pursuant
Convention. 6

to

a letter of request under the Hague

Option B: Unambiguous consent - Privacy Directive Article 7(a).
Article 7(a) of the Privacy Directive provides that processing of
personal data is lawful if the data subject gives unambiguous consent

to the processing." Like the Article 26(1)(a) consent exception to the
150. WP 48, supra note 149, at 26 ("It must be remembered that whatever the basis of the
transfer under Articles 25 and 26, processing involved in the transfer must still satisfy Article 6
to 8.").
151. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 7(c).
152. Id. art. 7(a).
153. Id. art. 7(f).
154. Id. art. 7(c).
155. WP 117, supra note 15, at 8. See also WP 128, supra note 11, at 18 (confirming that a
U.S. subpoena will not trigger the Article 7(c) exception because it is a foreign legal obligation
rather than a legal obligation arising within the European Union).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37. Notably, Article 7(c) could also be used
where an EU member state imposes national legal obligations that are the same as U.S. legal
obligations. See WP 117, supra note 15, at 8 (noting that although U.S. Sarbanes Oxley
whistleblowing schemes do not satisfy Article 7(c), EU whistleblowing schemes in the form of
national law in the same fields as Sarbanes Oxley would). However, the nature of the conflict
between U.S. discovery mechanisms and those employed in civil legal systems and the conflict
between U.S. and EU regulatory approaches to data protection law makes it unlikely that
Article 7(c) can be relied upon in that context.
157. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 7(a).
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transfer of personal data, Article 7(a) requires that the consent be
freely given, specific, and informed."' Depending on the nature of the
data involved in the discovery requests, litigants can seek consent
from the data subjects themselves. In fact, litigants in several cases
employed this technique. While some U.S. courts consider such
efforts evidence of a good-faith attempt to comply with U.S.
discovery procedures,159 other courts have ruled that "attempting to
obtain consents from affected third parties is not an alternate means
of production" because "[i]t may limit the information obtainable."'"
In this way, reliance on Article 7(a) may be appropriate in some
cases, but not in others.
Option C: Preparation of a legal claim or defense under Privacy
Directive Article 7(f).
Article 7(f) provides that processing of personal data is lawful if
"necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the
controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are
disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the interests
for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject."'' The
Working Party has recognized that an entity subject to both U.S. and
EU jurisdictions has "a legitimate interest in complying with
subpoenas under U.S. law. ' '162 In making this determination, the
Working Party found it particularly important that failure to comply
with U.S. subpoenas could lead to strict U.S. legal sanctions.
Similarly, litigants in a civil or commercial dispute have a legitimate
interest in complying with U.S. discovery rules, as they will otherwise
face serious sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."6
Nevertheless, before processing is lawful under Article 7(f), the
legitimate interest of the data controller must be balanced against
"the fundamental rights of data subjects." '65 According to the

158. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
159. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 202-03, 211 (1958); Alfadda v.Fenn, 149
F.R.D. 28, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Mr. Radwan's attempt to secure secrecy waivers, if genuine, is
indeed evidence of good faith.").
160. United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1290 (9th Cir. 1981).
161. Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 7(f).
162. WP 128, supra note 11, at 18.
163. Id.
164. See FED. R. Cv. P. 37 (listing possible sanctions as finding disputed factual issues in
favor of the other party, limiting claims, dismissing the action, rendering a default judgment, and
contempt of court).
165. WP 128,supra note 11, at 18.
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Working Party, any determination of lawfulness under Article 7(f)
must "take into account issues of proportionality, subsidiarity, the
seriousness of the alleged offences that can be notified and the
consequences for the data subjects."' 66 If the balancing test weighs in
favor of the controller and makes processing lawful under Article
7(f), the controller must also: give data subjects "the right to object at
any time on compelling legitimate grounds to the processing of the
data relating to them,'67 "inform data subjects about the existence,
purpose and functioning of its data processing, the recipients of the
personal data and the right of access, rectification and erasure by the
data subject,"' '6 and notify the appropriate national data protection
authorities of their processing activities. 69 Despite these substantial
processing requirements, Article 7(f) seems to be the most reliable
processing justification in the U.S. discovery context because the
Working Party has already determined that compliance with U.S.
court orders can constitute a legitimate interest for the purposes of
Article 7(f). 7°
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, it may be possible to use
specific provisions of the EU Privacy Directive to fully comply with
EU data protection law while simultaneously complying with a U.S.
discovery request. To do so, however, a litigant must first justify
transfer under Article 26(1)(d) and processing under Article 7(f). As
with the options for persuading U.S. courts to accept restricted
discovery, this strategy is unpredictable, necessitating a detailed,
comprehensive strategy for full compliance with both EU and U.S.
laws.
III. CONSTRUCTING A STRATEGY FOR FULL
COMPLIANCE
Although the conflict between U.S. discovery rules and the
Privacy Directive initially appears irreconcilable, deeper analysis

166. Id.
167. Id. This fulfills the requirements imposed by Privacy Directive Article 14. See Privacy
Directive, supra note 7, art. 14.
168. WP 128, supra note 11, at 19. This fulfills the requirements of Articles 10 and 11. See
Privacy Directive, supra note 7, arts. 10-11.
169. WP 128, supra note 11, at 19. This fulfills the requirements of Articles 18-20. See
Privacy Directive, supra note 7, arts. 18-20.
170. WP 128, supra note 11, at 18 ("It cannot be denied that SWIFT has a legitimate interest
in complying with the subpoenas under U.S. law.").
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reveals several options for simultaneous compliance with both sets of
rules. Given that each compliance option possesses strengths and
weaknesses, recommendations to parties in U.S.-EU trans-border
litigation for constructing a strong, three-tiered compliance strategy
are set forth below. Three tiers of compliance strategy are necessary
because no single strategy has been used successfully with enough
frequency to enable confidence in it alone. As a result, the strongest
strategy for full compliance involves a plan in which the top tier is the
best possible outcome and the third tier is an acceptable outcome.
The strategies were placed in tier one, two, or three, depending on
their history of success, projected cost, and projected time
consumption.
Tier 1: Seek a Protective Order from the U.S. Court
Litigants facing U.S. discovery requests for which compliance
requires violating the Privacy Directive should first seek a protective
order from the U.S. court excusing noncompliance. This strategy has
been successfully used by litigants facing a U.S. discovery-Privacy
Directive conflict.171 To succeed on a motion for a protective order, it
is helpful if the litigant:
1. is resisting production of documents172which would otherwise
help their case or are at least neutral;
2. demonstrates that the requested information originated in the
foreign country and remains there;'73

3. is supported in its motion by a statement from the foreign
sovereign that compliance with the discovery request is on its
face a violation of the Privacy Directive and its implementing
legislation and undermines sovereign interests;174and
4. shows evidence of good-faith attempts to comply with the
discovery request before seeking the protective order (such as
seeking consent from the data subjects, providing alternative
75
forms of the information that satisfies the request, etc.)

171. See Salerno v. Lecia, Inc., No. 97-CV-973S(H), 1999 WL 299306, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.
23, 1999); Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1995).
172. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212-13 (1958). See also United States v.
Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding this factor against a party resisting
production of documents that will likely hurt his case).
173. Volkswagen, 909 S.W.2d at 902.
174. See id. at 902-03; Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 34-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
175. Volkswagen, 909 S.w.2d at 9031; Alfadda, 149 F.R.D. at 40; In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d
494, 498 (D.C. 1987).
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Tier 2: Rely on Privacy Directive Articles 26(1)(d) and 7(f) to justify
full compliance with the U.S. discovery request.
If the protective order is denied, the litigant's second-tier
strategy should be to use the exceptions to the Privacy Directive to
fully comply with the U.S. discovery request. In particular the litigant
should:
1. rely on Article 26(1)(d) to transfer personal data for the
purpose of establishing, exercising, or defending a legal claim;
and
2. rely on Privacy Directive Article 7(f) to lawfully process the
transferred data to achieve the legitimate interests of the data
controller in complying with a U.S. discovery request and
avoiding U.S. sanctions for noncompliance.
Before proceeding with the transfer and processing in reliance on
these Privacy Directive provisions, the litigant should detail a
proposed method of transfer and processing and request approval
from the relevant EU member state data protection authority. To
obtain permission to proceed under Privacy Directive Articles
26(d)(1) and 7(f), the litigant should demonstrate to the data
protection authority that:
1. reliance on Article 26(1)(d) is necessary for the purposes of
the litigation because the U.S. court has already denied the
protective order and failure to comply with the discovery
request will result in severe sanctions;
2. the EU member state's obligations under the Hague Evidence
Convention 6 are satisfied by the proposed transfer and
processing;1

3. compliance with a U.S. discovery order is analogous to
compliance with a U.S. subpoena and is a legitimate interest
under Article 7(f);
4. the interests of the data subjects are being protected to the
highest possible extent so that their rights are not violated by
the processing of the data in litigation;
5. the consequences for the data subjects are minimal, if any; and
6. Privacy Directive Articles 6 and 8 will be respected. 77'
176. An example of this would be that the request is pursuant to litigation that has already
been filed so that Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention is not triggered.
177. Article 6 requires that personal data be
(a) processed fairly and lawfully;
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Although the Working Party has indicated tentative approval
of reliance on Article 7 for such purposes, it has not yet commented
on the specific issue of the U.S. discovery-EU Privacy Directive
conflict. As such, while this scheme theoretically satisfies the transfer
and processing rules set down by the Working Party, it is uncertain
whether the application of the rules in this context would be upheld.
As a result, this compliance strategy is less favorable than Tier 1 and
should be a litigant's second choice.
Tier 3: Petition the U.S. court for substitution of the Hague Evidence
Convention for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the relevant EU member state data protection authority
declines to approve the proposed transfer and processing under
Privacy Directive Articles 26(1)(d) and 7, the litigant's final attempt
to comply with both U.S. discovery rules and the Privacy Directive
should be to petition the U.S. court to substitute the Hague Evidence
Convention procedures for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With regard to this petition, the litigant should:
1. demonstrate the overly-broad nature of the discovery
requested of it;
2. use the denial of its transfer and processing proposal under
Tier 2 by the EU Member State data protection authority to
demonstrate the foreign country's aversion to the discovery
mechanisms used in this particular case; and

(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed
in a way incompatible with those purposes.... ;
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are
collected...;

(d) accurate, and... ;
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is
necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are
further processed.
Privacy Directive supra note 7, art. 6.
Article 8 prohibits the processing of several "special catagories of data," namely, "data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union
membership, and ... data concerning health or sex life." Id. art. 8. Privacy Directive Article 8,
however, does provide three exceptions to its prohibition of processing sensitive data that would
allow such processing during a lawsuit: (1) the data subject has given his specific consent, (2)
"processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and specific rights of
the controller in the field of employment law in so far as it is authorized by national law

providing for adequate safeguards," and (3) "the processing relates to data which are manifestly
made public by the data subject or is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defense of
legal claims." Id. arts. 8(2)(a), 8(2)(b), 8(2)(e).
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3. allege that no fact specific reason exists for the Hague
Evidence Convention procedures to not be effective.
Once the U.S. court authorizes the use of the Hague Evidence
Convention, the litigant must then go before the EU judicial
authority executing the letter of request and either argue that only
non-personal data should be provided via the letter of request
because of the Privacy Directive (recommended if the discoverable
material will likely hinder the litigant's case) 7 ' or the personal data
requested should be provided via the letter of request despite the
Privacy Directive (recommended if the discoverable material will
likely help the litigant's case).'79 When making the decision as to

which argument to advance before the EU executing authority, the
litigant should keep in mind that if a U.S. court remains unsatisfied
with the level of discovery achieved under the Hague Evidence
Convention procedures, the court retains the right to order
production under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the U.S. discovery-EU Privacy Directive conflict
remains difficult to navigate. Because the conflict is set within the
larger context of the civil versus common legal system approach to
evidence gathering, EU member states' data protection authorities
have increasingly called for the Working Party to comment on the
issue directly. Until the Working Party issues such comments, the
three-tiered compliance strategy offers the best opportunity for a
litigant facing the U.S. discovery-Privacy Directive conflict to comply
with both sets of rules. The most favorable outcome for the litigant is
to succeed in the first-tier strategy; however the second- and third-tier
strategies are more favorable than risking sanctions either under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Privacy Directive.

178. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
180. In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 356 (D. Conn. 1991).

